Competition between open-source and proprietary software: the (La)TeX case study by Alexandre Gaudeul
Competition between open-source and proprietary software:
the (L A)TEX case study.
Alexandre Gaudeul ∗
Universities of Toulouse and of Southampton
September 17, 2004
Abstract
The paper examines competition between two development models, proprietary and open-
source (“OS”). It ﬁrst deﬁnes and compares those two models and then analyzes the inﬂuence
the development of one type of software has on the development of the other. The paper is
based on the (L A)TEX case study (Gaudeul (2003a)).1 In that case study, the features, users,
and patterns in the development of the (L A)TEX software were compared to its proprietary
equivalents. The models that are presented in this paper describe some aspects of the strategic
interactions between proprietary and open-source software. The paper shows that they cannot
be analyzed independently; the decisions of one class of agents (OSS developers) are affected
by those of the other class of agents (private entrepreneurs).
1 Introduction
Software and related services account for about half of the information technology expenditures of
ﬁrms. Sales of packaged software generated $108 billion in revenues in 1997 in OECD countries,
those revenues growing at 11% per year since 1990. (OECD Information Technology Outlook
2000) Software markets have attracted interest from a public policy point of view (see Katz and
Shapiro (1999)).
A trend in recent year has been for companies to use open-source software (“OSS”) to reduce
their dependence on software and hardware vendors and their bundled service offerings. There
is little economic analysis of the way that trend will affect the software industry. Existing work
analyzes traditional and open-source (“OS”) development practice separately, while the present
paper shows that both cannot be analyzed independently; the decisions of one class of agents (OSS
developers) are affected by those of the other class of agents (private entrepreneurs) as they compete
for users but for different motives and following different rules.
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1It is important to understand how OSS affects welfare, as the governments, which are both im-
portant and leading investors in information and communication technology, must choose where
to source their software needs and what type of protection software innovation should be allowed.
Gaudeul (2004) deals with the question of what software license terms are best for welfare, while
Cr´ emer and Gaudeul (2004) or Lerner and Tirole (2004) explain further the interrelation between
public policy and innovation in the software industry. Furthermore, it is also important for pro-
fessionals and proprietary developers to understand how to position their product in the face of
competition from OSS.
The main insights in the model are based on the study of the (L A)TEX open-source software
(Gaudeul 2003a). Donald E. Knuth developed that typesetting software in the late 70s, released it
with an open-source license and it has become a reference in scientiﬁc publishing. TEX and L ATEX,
a set of macro based on TEX, are now used to typeset and publish much of the world’s scientiﬁc
literature in physics and mathematics. Both software will be collectively referred as (L A)TEX.
Appendix E presents the history of the development of TEX.
In this paper, I look at competition between open-source and proprietary software. The model
builds upon some major differences between open-source and proprietary development:
• It is more difﬁcult to achieve coordination and agreeing to goals in OSS development com-
pared to proprietary development. This is illustrated by the (L A)TEX case study as well as by
previous observations from the software engineering literature. This translates in the model
as some probability that the development of some features will be duplicated when it is done
OS because there is some chance that developers with the same needs do not meet and end-up
developing the same features independently.
• Developers do not derive the same economic surplus from software development than the
average user. This translates into different utility functions, the ﬁrst, that of developers, not
valuing the development of an user interface for the software, the second, that of the users,
valuing the user interface as a way to ease installation and learning of the software. That
difference can also be seen as a difference between experienced users of the software, who
will therefore not care about an interface even though it could have helped them in the past
to get to know and use the product, and novice users who have to decide whether to use the
software or not.
• Proprietary software ﬁrms and individual open-source developers have different objectives.
OS developers work under a license that prevents them in practice to make proﬁt based on the
selling of code they developed for an open-source project, so that they will develop features
that have value to them, not necessarily to the market. This also means that the OSS price
will be zero. Entrepreneurs on the other hand will try to maximize the market value of the
software and sell it at a positive price. This paper also introduces another cause for the
difference in objectives between OSS developers and entrepreneurs: the bodies ruling over
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which means new or potentially new users ﬁnd it difﬁcult to inﬂuence the dynamics of the
software’s development. Entrepreneur on the other hand may be faster in spotting new market
opportunities.
The rest of the introduction motivates the model further and presents some observations about
the dynamics of OS vs. proprietary software competition.
The ﬁrst part of the introduction exposes the way OSS organization achieve (or not) coordina-
tion between OSS developers, and how they choose their development objectives. In the case of
TEX, this leads to the delineation of different stages in the OSS organization’s life.
The second part of the introduction shows how difﬁcult it is for an OSS organization to develop
an interface, and shows how in the case of TEX private efforts by proprietary companies provided
the ﬁrst easy to use versions of the software.
The third part of the introduction shows how users and developers’ needs are aligned in the
choice of the OSS development objectives, not, as is stated too often, because users are developers,
but because developers do not differ too much from the standard user, and because they understand
the need to develop popular software to beneﬁt from network effects.
The fourth part analyzes the patterns of competition between OS and proprietary software. They
serve different users over time as each type of software develops in reaction to competition from
the other side. Proprietary versions of the software serve to popularize the OSS on which they are
based, or serve as inducers into the use of OS versions.
The paper is then divided in three parts, each one using the same framework:
In the ﬁrst part, the lower quality of the user interface in open-source development translates
into OSS serving either low or high value software users (depending on whether the OSS came to
developlessormorefeatures, respectively, thantheproprietarysoftwareﬁrms). Therearealsocases
where the proprietary software retains a monopoly position on the market. When the proprietary
software offers more feature than the OSS one, it will set a high price and users who cannot afford
it will use the OSS even though it is more costly to learn. When both have the same features, then
the proprietary ﬁrm will set its price at the value of its interface and gain the whole market. When
the OSS has more feature, then some users who value the software’s functionalities the most will
forfeit the proprietary ﬁrm’s interface and use the OSS instead.
In the second part, network effects are introduced. Network effects play a role when choosing
software: users want to use software that others use. This is because they are concerned with adopt-
ing a widely used standard (as in the case of TEX and any document processing software, where
the ability to exchange documents is crucial), or because they believe this will ensure continued de-
velopment and maintenance of the software (that argument is particularly valid for OSS). Network
effects are shown to lead more often to the development of a full-featured OSS as developers take
into account the increase in market share from developing more features. This has an ambiguous
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prietary product, but when she does, she will make more proﬁt and have a larger market share than
when network effects were not present.
In the third part, users are divided into two groups, those whose utility functions for the soft-
ware’s features coincide with that of OS developers, and those who value its features differently.
This leads to a differentiation between the features of proprietary and open-source software: the
entrepreneur may choose either to develop the same features as the OS developers and gain the
whole market thanks to its better user interface, or develop different features and concentrate on the
users that have different tastes than the OS developers. It can in that case set a high price for its
product even though it will beneﬁt from lower network effects.
A discussion at the end of the paper will deal with the difference between BSD and GPL soft-
ware. (L A)TEX’s license is similar to the Berkeley Software Distribution (“BSD”), but the models
are based on the assumption the OS license is the General Public License (“GPL”).
1.1 Openness vs. efﬁciency and development objectives
The software engineering literature points to problems with coordination in OSS development.
Herbsleb and Mockus (2003) show that distributed work faces difﬁculties as it slows down de-
velopment, impedes changes to the software and leads to lesser communication between project
participants than what could be achieved when development is done in the same place and under
the same authority as happens in proprietary software development. Yamauchi, Yokozawa, Shino-
hara, and Ishida (2000) underlines limitations of strictly electronic forms of communication due to
the lack of spontaneous conversation and the inability to share complex and ambiguous messages.
On the other hand, OSS advocates point to the need in OSS development to back up any claim
and projects with evidences as no argument of authority can be made. The need to state one’s
ideas in clear terms helps in improving them, and any development is archived for all to see (CVS
archives), which allows anybody to follow and improve the work of others. It is therefore not clear
coordination is always better in proprietary software development.
In the case of TEX, the organization went through four phases:
In the ﬁrst phase, development was heavily centralized around D.E. Knuth at Stanford Uni-
versity, who set the goals for developers working with him and made suggestions for work by
independent developers. He also queried for suggestions by the software’s projected users, notably
the American Mathematical Society (“AMS”).
In a second phase, as D.E. Knuth withdrew from active development, a number of packages
were developed in a rather decentralized way, leading to many replications in the development of
similar features. The program became more complex and the number of programs linked to it rose:
programs to draw ﬁgures, to do indexes, nationalizations of the software to deal with non-American
typesetting traditions and characters, programs to output TEX in various alternative formats (HTML,
XML, pdf...), user interfaces, rewritings of the software in various programming languages, etc.
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persons. Several macro packages were developed for TEX. The L ATEX package, developed by Leslie
Lamport, rapidly became the most widely adopted. This was a stage of relative anarchy where the
‘best’ projects were those that succeeded in attracting the most users and on which the rest ﬁnally
coordinated.
In a third stage, the TEX Users Group worked to propose a common distribution (TEXLive) with
a common set of standards (The TEX directory structure) a common repository (The Comprehensive
TEX Archive Network) and a central group of developers (The L ATEX3 team).
The fourth and present stage is characterized by a return to decentralization. This is due to the
combination of several factors: the Internet OSS community is now sufﬁciently organized to allow
for the efﬁcient coordination of projects on the Web, and there is not necessarily the need for a
central forum where developers can meet face to face, such as the TEX users group. The software is
increasingly international and responds to needs that the core group of developers did not predict,
or that the TEX software cannot respond to without big changes. This means development is more
and more specialized, or occurs outside of the original setting.
This shows a relative lack of efﬁciency of the organization in coordinating development; from
the moment the original group of developers were not anymore working together in the same place,
there were many example of parallel development of the same type of feature, either because de-
velopers didn’t know each other, or because they disagreed on the objectives for development.
The difﬁculty in getting people to agree on objectives and pursuing them together is not wholly
due to some inefﬁciency of the organization. In fact, some projects were ignored by the central
organization and had to be pursued outside of its setting simply because they did not ﬁt with the
organization’s objective. That difﬁculty in adopting new ideas and integrating new developers is due
to network effects. Those are particularly important for typesetting software such as TEX: it was to
be a document exchange standard, and this encouraged both better coordination of developers (they
had to agree on any change in the software) and in making the software accessible to many users
(the more people use a standard, the higher its value).
As the central organization was recognized as essential in maintaining a standard L ATEX, it was
difﬁcult to initiate new projects without its approval. New users, with different needs than the ones
originally intended for the program, would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to initiate projects in their own interests
with the approval and support of the existing organization. The alternative was therefore between
breaking away – but convincing many users that the new project is sufﬁciently interesting is almost
impossible2 – and integrating the core development team – but making the new goals understood
and easy to implement takes time. This worked to slow development of innovative ideas in TEX, a
problem that was exploited by some software ﬁrms: they were motivated to initiate those projects
in the expectation of future proﬁts drawn from users whose needs were not ﬁlled by the existing
OSS.
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are two developers and two features to be developed. With probability α the two developers meet
and agree on who will develop what feature. With probability 1 − α they do no meet and they
develop the feature that brings them the highest individual beneﬁt. On the other hand, in propri-
etary software, an entrepreneur will hire developers and assign to them development tasks so that
coordination problems will not be present.
The rigidity in development objectives of open-source organizations will be modeled the fol-
lowing way: There are two features to be developed and two kinds of consumers. One kind of
consumers values the ﬁrst feature higher than the second, while the second kind of consumers val-
uesthesecondfeaturehigherthantheﬁrst. TheﬁrstkindofconsumerscontrolstheOSdevelopment
process, so that the ﬁrst feature will be developed OS instead of the second. On the other hand, in
proprietary software, an entrepreneur will develop the feature that brings her highest proﬁts.
1.2 Developing an interface for TEX and facilitating its use
Software is the addition of many features that are chosen and grouped together into a product, either
by a software company or by an OSS organization. A distribution is the ﬁnal product offered by an
OSS organization to the common user of the software. On that distribution may be superposed an
interface, which will be deﬁned as any feature that facilitates the installation and use of the software.
Another way to see the “interface” in the case of enterprise software is the cost to pay an
employee to maintain the software or the cost to obtain support from the software company that
installed the software. Those costs can be very important, as about two-thirds of the cost of software
is maintenance and support.
There are three stages in the practical availability of OSS to different groups of users: in a ﬁrst
stage, there are raw programs: those are usable only by sophisticated users. in a second stage,
the programs are integrated in a distribution: this links many programs together and requires that
each program conform to some guidelines. Not all programs are integrated a distribution, as not all
developers are motivated to make the changes that are necessary for this to happen. In a third stage,
a user interface is built on top of the distribution: this allows easier access to all the functionalities.
This is also the stage where a quick way to install the distribution on mainstream operating systems
is provided. In this paper, I make a further differentiation between providing an easy-to-install
distribution, and providing a good user interface. TEX, like many OSS projects, was able to get to
the stage of providing a complete easy-to-install distribution, but the OS user interface are not to
the level of mainstream proprietary WYSIWYG text editors.
In the typology of Garvin (1984), OSS scores well on performance, feature, reliability and
conformance, but is lacking in durability, serviceability, aesthetic and perceived quality. The ﬁrst
four are related to quality from the point of view of developers, while the last four are related to
quality as perceived by users. Developers are able to compensate for the lack in the last four items,
because they are expert users who can change the software when it becomes outdated, can ﬁx its
bugs and do not care so much for aesthetic as for ergonomics3. Nichols and Twidale (2003) is a
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face in developing an user-friendly software interface. Johnson (2002) gives another argument in
part 5.3 of his article on why OSS may be less complete and user friendly than corresponding
closed source applications. Open-source advocate argue that Linux has made improvements in its
user-friendliness, and that OSS can be as user-friendly as proprietary software. While an individual
user may not be able or willing to develop an user interface, individuals who are responsible in their
organization for the installation, maintenance and usage of an OSS may be motivated to develop
interfaces and write user manuals that they then can make available to the wider user community.
Such efforts are indeed mentioned in the case study of TEX, when individual efforts in universities
werethen diffusedona wordof mouthbasis. ThoseOS effortsarehowever generallyuncoordinated
with the core development team, which doesn’t have the same concern than those who develop
interfaces.
In the case of TEX a good, fully-functional and easy to install TEX distribution was ﬁnally made
available to the general user by the OSS organization, but its interface never was as aesthetically
pleasing or ergonomically efﬁcient as that of Microsoft’s Word for example, that of competing
proprietary typesetting software such as Quark, or of software based on TEX such as Microsoft
Word.
TEX managed to be relatively accessible to the common user for three reasons:
The ﬁrst is that it was developed in a domain that did not hold special interest for developers.
This means that from the beginning on, the main motivation for its development was to make use of
the software, not to signal programming ability. In fact, TEX came out of the lucky coincidence in
one developer of the need for high quality mathematical typesetting and exceptional programming
skills, combined with the fact Donald E. Knuth wanted his program to be accessible to the larger
academic community so as to promote high quality typesetting.
The second is that TEX was meant to become a standard and this discouraged forking: develop-
ers were disciplined into producing software that respected TEX speciﬁcations. TEX license indeed
prevented any program that did not pass some tests (TRIP/TRAP) devised by D.E. Knuth from
calling itself TEX.
The third is that TEX’s license allowed for proprietary implementations of TEX. Therefore, good
interfaces, such as that provided by Scientiﬁc Workplace, were soon made available to the general
public and contributed to making TEX more popular, even if not under an OS version.
As seen in part 1.2, the TEX Users’ group was ﬁnally able to propose a standard easy to use
versionofTEX, whichdisplacedproprietaryversions. However, thesuccessoftheOSSorganization
was not total. Indeed, Microsoft’s Word took many of the less sophisticated users of TEX, while
publishers were attracted by Quark or Framemaker, which were competing typesetting tools with
a much larger user base than TEX and could respond to the average non-mathematical publisher’s
needs.
Because of its lack of an interface, TEX was left either with those users who could not afford
proprietary typesetting software (emerging countries, students), those people who needed its math-
7ematical capabilities (academics) and those typesetters who valued the ﬂexibility open source offers
to devise their own specialized versions of TEX (Omega for multi-lingual typesetting was developed
to typeset rare script and ancient documents with complex typesetting, ConTEXt was developed to
produced interactive educational material).4
Modelization: The interface development problem in open-source will be modeled the following
way: open-source developers will be assumed to derive no personal beneﬁt from developing an
interface, while the interface will have value ψ to all users. Developers and users will be assumed
to derive beneﬁt kx from the use of the software by proportion x of the population, with k ≥ 0
(network effects). For k sufﬁciently high, a developer will therefore be motivated to develop an
interface so as to increase the OSS’s market share.
1.3 The alignment between users and developers’ needs
The na¨ ıve version of how OSS and decentralized development manage to fulﬁll the needs of com-
mon software users is that any user can develop the feature she needs, so that any user’s need is
fulﬁlled with OSS. Of course, the mechanism is not so simple, as making changes in an OSS re-
quires qualiﬁcation that most users do not have. Franke and von Hippel (2002) and von Hippel and
von Krogh (2003) underline a more complex system by studying the Apache open-source software
and the objectives of its different classes of users. They show that developers’ objective do not
stray very far from the requirement of common users. In comparison with proprietary software
development, von Hippel (1994) argues that OSS enjoys better access to sticky information about
users’ needs, those that are too expensive to determine in a one-to-one relationship between users
and manufacturers.
In the case of TEX, another additional effect was at play, which consisted in consultation be-
tween the user base and developers. Gaudeul (2003b) cites examples of collaboration from the
inception on between potential users of TEX and its developers. The AMS notably sent some rep-
resentatives to Stanford to test Knuth’s new Document Preparation System. The AMS ﬁnanced the
development of its own version of TEX and then of L ATEX. Companies inﬂuenced the development
of TEX through sponsorship of speciﬁc projects. PdfTEX to output TEX in pdf format was thus de-
veloped by H` an Thˆ e ´ Th` anh partly under a scholarship from Adobe Corporation. The TEX users’
group ﬁnanced the development of a new version of TEX, NTS, that was meant to be more easily
extendable than Knuth’s program. Local Users’ Group, those based in other countries than the US,
also worked to ﬁt TEX to their national needs.
Another mechanism by which users’ needs and those of developers were aligned is simply that
some features in TEX were inspired by previously existing and successful proprietary software (Bell
Group’s ROFF notably, or IBM’s Script) and L ATEX packages were inspired by Reid’s Scribe. Fi-
nally, while proprietary versions of TEX were often the ﬁrst to integrate some user-oriented features
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ier manipulation of a more diverse set of fonts by Y&Y), the OS developers frequently caught up
quite quickly, although it is not clear how much of their development was inspired by proprietary
advances.
Modelization: The alignment between developers and users’ needs will be modeled this way:
Developers assign value v to a ﬁrst feature and value v to a second feature, while users assign
value xv to the ﬁrst feature and value xv to the second feature, with x distributed in the population
according to a continuous distribution function f. This means that without even making any market
research, an open-source developer will develop in priority the features that users most value.
1.4 Patterns in the competition between open-source and proprietary software
There is often competition between OS and proprietary software, as there is signiﬁcant overlap
between functions developed OS and those developed proprietary. Proprietary and OSS users’ base
are however signiﬁcantly different (Feller and Fitzgerald (2000)): OS users are primarily expert
users and early adopters, computer experts, small businesses and academic/research institutions.
This paper gives some rationale for the difference in the software’s user bases.
Few papers model competition between OS and proprietary software and its consequences on
welfare, innovation and product design.
Schmidt and Schnitzer (2002) explain the coexistence of both type of software by resorting
to an exogenous users’ taste for each type of software. They underline how OSS reduces propri-
etary ﬁrms’ motivation to innovate. In the present model, as proprietary software develops a better
interface than OSS, there will be a differentiation between users with some of them buying the
proprietary software for its interface even when the OSS provides equivalent features.
Baake and Wichmann (2004) analyze proprietary ﬁrms’ choice to release some of their code OS
and explain there is a balance to be found between the danger of facilitated entry by competitors and
the beneﬁt of decreased coding cost. Their model is useful to analyze the difference in strategies
between ﬁrms basing their product on TEX such as Scientiﬁc Workplace, and ﬁrm such as Quark
that wrote a software from scratch.
Khalak (2000) underlines the advantage proprietary ﬁrms enjoy in advertising their product,
as they can cover that cost with future proﬁts. Its point will be used later in the paper to explain
how, when OS and proprietary software are equivalent and there are network effects, the proprietary
software can gain the whole market and price its product so that no customer wants to switch to OS
and lose the beneﬁt of using the same software as everybody else.
Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2003) analyzes strategic reaction by proprietary software
ﬁrms to the emergence of OSS and shows they can preserve their position on the market. They intro-
duce demand-side learning effects in their model, whereby a dominant software remains dominant
because it receives more suggestion for improvements or bug reports. This may be complemented
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TeX User interfaces: TEXMacs and LYX.
Distributions: NTS, ConTEXt and
Omega, encouraged as successors to
TEX. MiKTEX, an alternative to
TEXLive
PCTEX and MicroTEX, early imple-
mentations for the PC. Scientiﬁc Word
by McKichan Software, an user inter-
face for Windows with added function-
alities. Y&Y for fonts, TEXtures by




Abiword, Corel’s Wordperfect which
were proprietary software then
released open-source. Various
HTML/SGML/XML editors as XML
replaces the TEX syntax as a mark-up
language.
TROFF/NROFF for Unix by the Bell
Labs, Scribe by IBM, Script were early
competitors. Then came Adobe’s Inde-
sign, QuarkXPress, Framemakers for
general typesetting, 3B2 for mathemat-
ical typesetting, Word for the common
user.
Table 1: Typesetting software
by supply-side learning effects whereby you will invest more into a software that is popular. That
paper is one of the few that introduce dynamic interaction between proprietary software ﬁrms and
OS developers. Because demand-side effects introduce indirect network effects, the ﬁrm will price
as a function of the market share advantage it has over OSS in a manner that is very similar to the
present paper.
In the case of TEX, much has already been said in this paper about how both type of software
competed over time. The table 1 p.10 recapitulates the various competitors of TEX along two di-
mensions, whether the software is open-source or proprietary, and whether it was based on TEX or
not. The standard (L A)TEX open-source offering is itself very diverse. An ofﬁcial distribution (fp-
TeX for Windows, teTeX for Unix) based on the Web2c port of TEX into the C language, cohabits
with other distributions maintained by individuals (MiKTEX, Bakoma, TEXnic) which all are based
on TEX or L ATEX but specialize in one area of typesetting. The chronology 2 p.37 charts the devel-
opment of those software over time and Appendix E will be an helpful reference when discussing
the dynamics of the development of TEX.
The previous parts have already underlined how the audience of each type of software differed
or how OS and proprietary software borrowed features and ideas from each other.5 The main
raison d’ˆ etre for proprietary versions of TEX was to provide an user interface and easy to install
L ATEX distribution. TEXLive, the OS distribution of TEX, and graphical user interfaces such as
the shareware WinEdt or the freeware (not open source) WinShell thus spelled the end of many
proprietary versions of TEX. Only those proprietary software that had diversiﬁed into features that
the OS community was not able to develop, such as the WYSIWYG equation editor of Scientiﬁc
Workplace and its integration of the Maple computation program, were able to survive.
The discussion of the difference between GPL and BSD OS software for what relates to the
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Even though proprietary software based on TEX could be marketed without revealing their source
code, this did not spell in any way the end of that software’s OS versions. The inﬂuence was more
subtle, as proprietary versions broadened the appeal of that typesetting system and frequently acted
as inducers into the use of the more sophisticated and ﬂexible OS versions.
The rest of the paper is directed towards explaining the consequences and effects of three main
factors in the competition between OS and proprietary software. The ﬁrst is the lower efﬁciency
of coordination in OSS development compared to proprietary ﬁrms, the second is how network
effects inﬂuence the design of OSS such as to make it more accessible to the average user, the
third deals with the difference in objectives between an OSS organization that cares only for its
existing constituency, and a proprietary ﬁrm that wants to gain new customers and market shares.
The models will allow to explain some characteristics of the user base of each type of software, and
will show when a proprietary version of an OS software can be developed proﬁtably.
The following model will serve as the basis for further modeling, and is thus detailed.
2 Description of a basic model
There are four types of players, users, open-source developers, an entrepreneur and an open-source
software organization.
Users have the choice between a GPL licensed OS product which is sold at price 0 or a propri-
etary one which is sold at price P. The product is a software system that can include two features.
Open-source developers value one feature at v and the other at v. If both features are developed, the
software’s value to developers is v + v. Users order the value of each feature in the same way than
developers, but the value they get from them is a fraction x of what developers get. That fraction
x is distributed over the interval [0,1] according to the distribution function f(x). Each user is
characterized by its type x, that is her private knowledge. f is a logconcave distribution function,
which means that the log of the cumulative distribution function of x is a concave function. This
property is equivalent to the ratio of the density function to the c.d.f. being a monotone decreasing
function. (Bagnoli and Bergstrom 1989). There is a mass n of potential users. For simplicity, one
user who values a feature at fraction x of v will value the other feature at that same fraction of its
value to developers.6 x thus determines the proﬁciency with which a user may be able to use a
software in a category, not the value she attributes to each of its features. Users face a cost ψ to
make a productive use of the software, no matter how many functionalities it has.7 That cost can be
reduced to 0 if the software is provided with an interface.
2.1 Open-source development
There are two possible features that an open-source developer can implement, one with value v and
the other with value v. A developer can choose to develop the feature of value v or the feature of
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1 − λ. A developer can also expend C to develop an user interface for the software program and
thus reduce the users’ learning and usage cost ψ to 0. However, the value of the interface is 0 to the
developer as she already incurred learning and usage costs. She can develop only one feature or an
interface.
One developer thus has the choice between developing a feature, an interface, or doing nothing
and the payoff to a developer is therefore:
UD = max[v(aD) − C(aD),0]
where aD denotes the decision which feature to develop. From the above, v(ﬁrst feature ) = v,
v(second feature ) = v, v(interface ) = 0, C( develop a feature ) = c or c and C( develop the
interface ) = C.
Assumption 1
v > c > v > c
This means that with probability 1 − λ, it is not proﬁtable for a developer to develop the lower
valued feature, while it is always proﬁtable to develop the ﬁrst one.
OS development is sequential. In a ﬁrst period, a ﬁrst developer chooses which feature to
develop. In a second period, a second developer comes. An OS developer develops a feature if it
is not available and the cost of developing is lower than the value of the feature. However, in the
second period, the developer is aware with probability α only of the work of the ﬁrst developer.
2.2 Proprietary development
An entrepreneur has access to a pool of developers. A developer will develop a feature or the
interface for a wage w. The entrepreneur doesn’t get any value from using the software, but can sell
it on the market and get its market value. Its market value is determined by the price P at which
it sells the software multiplied by the number of users who buy it at that price. The entrepreneur
chooses which features to develop, and whether to develop an interface. The entrepreneur is the
one who decides which action a developer is going to take, and must hire one developer for every
function she wants to see developed.





with x s.t. u(x,Prop) ≥ u(x,OS)
u(x,Prop) ≥ 0
12and W depending on the number of developers that were hired. Since a developer can develop
only one feature, W will also depend on the number of features that were developed. u(x,Prop)
denotes the utility of consumer of type x from consuming the proprietary product. The constraints
ensure that the user indeed prefers the proprietary product to the open-source one, and secondly,
that is rational for her to buy it.
2.3 Consumers’ utility functions and decisions
After developers have made their development decisions, the open-source software product, which
may include one or two features and an interface, is put on the market. An alternative, proprietary
software product may also be available depending on the decision of the entrepreneur. Users choose
which software to use (proprietary or OS) by comparing the value of the proprietary software (sum
of the value of its features minus set-up costs minus price) to the value of the OS software.
The payoff to an user of type x who buys software of value v at price p is:
u(x) = xv − p − ψ
where
x ∼ f[0,1], uniform
v ∈ {v,v,v + v}
(p,ψ) ∈ R2
and ψ = 0 if the product includes an interface.
The payoff to a developer who buys software of value v at price p is
uD = v − p
i.e. x = 1 and ψ = 0 as explained previously.
2.4 Chronology of development
The chronology of development is the following:
• OS development happens ﬁrst. It is sequential. In a ﬁrst period, a ﬁrst developer chooses
which feature to develop. In a second period, a second developer comes. An OS developer
develops a feature if it is not available and the cost of developing is lower than the value of
the feature. However, in the second period, the developer is aware with probability α only of
the work of the ﬁrst developer.
13It is always unproﬁtable to develop an interface, because that doesn’t bring any value to a
developer, and costs C to develop. It will therefore not be developed. It may be unproﬁtable
to develop the lowest valued feature, given the assumptions on the cost of development and
the value of the features. It is however always valuable to develop the highest valued feature.
This means that with probability one, a ﬁrst developer develops the highest valued function.
Then, with probability α, a second developer learns about her work and develops the second
most valued feature, provided it is valuable for her to do so. With probability 1 − α, she
doesn’t learn about the work of the ﬁrst developer and she develops the most valued feature
as well. When OS development is ﬁnished, it is made available to all.
• The entrepreneur learns what features are available open-source but cannot integrate them in
its product. She decides whether to develop a program, which features it will include and
whether it will incorporate an interface. She then hires as many developers as features she
wants to develop, pays wages and gets the features developed. When the product is ﬁnished,
she sets its price P, with P set such as to maximize expected proﬁts.
• Consumers learn P and the features that are included in both products and choose which
product to buy and/or use.
Assumption 2
vx∗ ≥ ψ
with x∗ = max
x x(1 − F(x))
This means that the value of the interface is not too high. This will simplify the search for an
equilibrium.
2.5 Analysis
There is a trade-off between quality (number of features that are included) and ease of use of
the software (how convenient is the interface). The functionality and the interface aspects of the
software are different because they bring different payoffs to users and to developers. OSS is limited
by the fact developers are motivated by their own use of the software and not the use others may do
of it (this translates in the interface not being developed).
The open-source and proprietary software will compete based on price and functionality. If
the OS developers didn’t coordinate their work and both developed the same function, and if it
was proﬁtable for the entrepreneur to develop both functions, then the OSS’s functionality may be
less than that of the proprietary software. The price of the proprietary software will have to be
incentive-compatible for the users as they have the option to use the open-source software instead.
The proprietary software is more efﬁcient in terms of development cost (no duplication of effort,
better coordination) but may produces less consumer welfare as its price excludes some users from
the market.
14Proposition 1 (Characterization of equilibrium: number of features, prices, market shares.) Depending
on w and ψ, 3 types of equilibria may emerge: either the open-source software is used by nobody,
or it is used by low types users, or it is used by high type users.
Proof. In appendix A
If development costs (w) and the value of the interface (ψ) are high, then the proprietary soft-
ware may include less features than the OSS but will provide an interface. In that case, a full-
featured OSS may compete with a proprietary software that includes less features but an interface.
The OSS software will serve only higher value users, while the proprietary software will serve
those customers who have a lower value for the software’s features. In all other cases, the propri-
etary software serves higher value users. In those cases, the proprietary software will serve the same
customers as if it was a monopoly except when its only advantage over the open source software is
in its interface. In that later case, it will serve more consumers than if it was a monopoly and no
consumers will use the OSS.
The proprietary software may include only the interface on top of the ﬁrst function because the
interface’s value is the same for all, while the second function’s value can be very low for some
users. Proprietary software can be sold only as long as it adds features compared to the OSS. Both
types of software do not compete on the basis of the most valuable, basic functions, but on the basis
of the smaller, less valuable features which may not be valuable for an individual developer to work
on, but will be developed by an entrepreneur because they provide a comparative advantage on the
market. The proprietary software developer may decide not to develop both features, and instead
develop only the ﬁrst feature plus the interface. In that case, it will either keep its monopoly share
of customers (in the case where the OSS has got only the ﬁrst feature) or it will serve the lower end
of the market (when the OSS is full featured).
We therefore have three cases: either sophisticated users use the OSS, or it is low-value users
who do, or the OSS is not used by anybody. This model shows there are no cases where the OSS
serves both low and high value users. An OS software’s public is therefore either those users
who have a high valuation for the software (Expert and commercial users) or those who have low
valuation for the product (Third World, students). The second case is the one that has received the
most attention but this model shows there is a special case when proprietary software may be less
powerful but easier to use than OSS software and OSS users who have high value for the software’s
features forego the ease of use of the proprietary version for the additional capabilities of the OS
version. That case also corresponds to some claims by OSS proponents, who point out that OSS
may be better adapted to sophisticated users. Finally, it is interesting to note that in this model,
whenever the only contribution from the proprietary software is to add an interface on the OSS
product, then the proprietary software will get the whole market.
Those results can be illustrated with the TEX case study: there is a high demand for TEX in
less developed, emerging or post-communist countries (New users’ organization have sprung up in
Hungary and China, for example). This corresponds to the case where OSS is used by ‘low value
15users’. There also is an use of TEX in high-end publishing, where other software are too limited
even though they are readier to use. This corresponds to the case where OSS is used by high value
users. Proprietary interface based on TEX also did take a lot of users who would have used the OSS
otherwise, and left TEX with only developers as its public during the early development period. This
corresponds to the case where nobody uses the OSS.
The process by which TEX managed to get back some of those users by developing better
interface and better integration will be explained in the part about network effects; this process may
have been due to the fear that the software would fall into oblivion if it did not manage to get some
users back.
Proposition 2 (The impact of OSS on consumer welfare.) Compared to a situation where OSS
wouldn’t exist, OSS unambiguously increases consumer welfare as long as it doesn’t discourage
the development of a full featured proprietary software with an interface.
OSS decreases the price of the proprietary software but this doesn’t necessarily increase the
number of users who have access to it. The presence of an OSS never allows to attain the social
optimum from the point of view of consumers as an interface will never be developed open-source,
so that its zero price doesn’t mean the whole market is served.
Proof. In appendix B
From proposition 2, there are many cases to consider when evaluating the effect of OSS on
consumer welfare.
1. When both types of software are developed, and the proprietary software includes both fea-
tures and the interface, the consumer welfare is higher than if there was only one type of
software (proprietary). Indeed, there is a range of consumers who were not served before and
who will be able to use the OSS, while the price of the proprietary software will be lower
than in the monopoly case.
2. When both types of software are developed, but both include only one feature and the only
advantage of the proprietary software over the OS one is the interface, then the consumer
welfare may be lowered compared to the monopoly case even though the price of the propri-
etary software is lowered and more customers have access to it. This is because the second
feature is not developed.
3. If the presence of the open-source alternative discourages proprietary development of the
interface, then the result is ambiguous as the price of the proprietary software is lowered and
a portion of consumers who were not served now have access to the OSS, but all consumers
must now incur higher set up costs.
4. If the presence of an open-source alternative discourages proprietary software development
altogether, then the consumer welfare may be lowered: more customers have access to the
16software, but since it is OS, it doesn’t include an interface and it may also include less features
than the proprietary version.
TheexistenceofOSSpotentiallydecreasesconsumerwelfare, incasetheproprietarysoftwareis
not developed and one of the features is not developed under OS conditions. If the OS organization
is effective (high α, so that the probability developers are aware of each other’s work is high) and
the probability λ there is high cost of development is average, then there are lower chances the
proprietary software is developed. A very high λ favors proprietary software, because it means
there is a high probability that the OSS will include only one functionality, and a very low λ also
favors proprietary software because it means development costs will be low (assuming the wage w
is related to the average cost of development Ec). Consumer welfare is improved the more likely it
is the proprietary software’s only advantage is in its interface as it will have to price at ψ and sell to
more customers than otherwise.
The case where the proprietary software developed both features plus the interface and the OSS
also developed both features is therefore the most efﬁcient. The more efﬁcient the OSS organization
is, the more likely the proprietary ﬁrm sets a lower price and serves more users. OSS therefore has
an effect on proprietary software production beyond reducing its proﬁt as it also potentially forces
it to serve more consumers; in that case, the effect on consumer welfare is unambiguously positive
as long as the proprietary software develops both features and the interface.
The proprietary ﬁrm enjoys an advantage over the OS organization in that it is the only one to
be able to develop an interface. Due to incentive constraints, the OS developers are not motivated
to develop it, and this allows the proprietary ﬁrm to maintain the appearance of monopoly: either it
serves the same customers as if it was a monopoly, and leaves the lower end to OSS, or it serves all
the market.
There is a part of the market which still isn’t served, the portion of those people who have a low
value for the software, so that they don’t buy the proprietary one, and don’t use the OS software
either because set-up costs are too high. This means OSS doesn’t allow to reach the social optimum.
Public policy The public policy question about open-source software often concerns States that
have no software industry to care for, but have to decide whether they should encourage the use of
OSSalternativestosoftwareboughtfromforeigncompanies. Inthatcalculation, theythereforeonly
consider consumer welfare. OSS has the advantage of being free, but may have less features and be
more difﬁcult to use than proprietary software. However, its existence encourages the proprietary
software to lower its price.
For a country with an important software industry, and which therefore considers global welfare
in its calculations, it may be a good idea to encourage OSS development as long as it doesn’t
discourage the development of a full featured proprietary software and the costs of development
are not too high. The costs of development must not be too high because else, it is not advisable to
encourage double development (OS and proprietary) of the same types of features. The effect on
17consumer and global welfare is even more ambiguous if OSS discourages proprietary development
of a feature or of the interface, but it can still be positive in that case.
3 Network effects:
In this part, we consider the impact of network effects on the pricing and design decision of the
entrepreneur and of open-source developers. For simplicity, assume there are no set-up costs so
that the interface is never developed.8
The consideration of network effects is important for three reasons: 1) they arise naturally from
the way open-source software is developed, 2) open-source developers attach a lot of importance to
them, and 3) open-source and proprietary software are seldom used together, which means that the
networks they draw on are very differentiated.
1. Open-source software draws its developers from its users. Mockus, Fielding, and Herbsleb
(2000) and Mockus, Fielding, and Herbsleb (2002) and their study of the contributors to
the Apache project, Ghosh and Prakash (2000) and the Orbiten free software survey, have
outlined three types of way by which users contribute to the quality of the OS software: a
ﬁrst, small group of developers develops most of the code, a second group contributes ﬁxes
and suggestions for changes, and the last, largest group report bugs.
The incremental contribution of each individual in those groups is a decreasing function
in time as the main problems get solved in priority, but each contribute positively to the
quality of the software. There is also a process of conversions of users into developers that
is at work; users go up the OS learning curve and are frequently able to contribute to its
development after some time using it. While that effect is not present to such an extent in
proprietary software, it also exists as users report problems and the ﬁrms are more motivated
to develop the software the higher the number of potential users there are. Of course, for
many software, there also are direct network effects, as the value of a software increases
the higher the number of people you can exchange data and document with it. In the case
of TEX and of other typesetting software, standards for document processing and output are
very important. The TEX community gives a lot of importance to the preservation of TEX as
a standard for mathematical typesetting, thus recognizing the importance of network effects.
2. The OS developers frequently have a missionary attitude to OSS, and often deﬁne themselves
in opposition to proprietary alternatives. They try not only to develop good software that ﬁts
their needs, but they also try to convert other developers and users to OS. Stallman’s FSF was
founded precisely to encourage such aims, and he hoped “to supply, eventually, everything
useful that normally comes with a Unix system” (Stallman 1983). The project was aimed at
providing an alternative to a proprietary software. Linux was generated as an alternative to
Andrew Tannenbaum’s Minix, which was too expensive for Linus Torvalds.9
18Linux users are frequently seen as anti-Microsoft, and there is generally a high level of dis-
trust between the OS community and proprietary software ﬁrms. A great part of that deﬁance
is due to the perceived need by OS users to establish a large user base for OSS to become
more than a niche market, and for its development to be dynamic. OSS developers are there-
fore conscious of network effects, and take it into account when making their development
decisions. Indeed, some projects relating to Linux, such as Gnome, are primarily directed
towards producing a rival to MS’s Windows. They want to make an user interface to Linux
such as to make it as easy to use as Windows, and thus distract some of its users.
3. OSS and proprietary software are seldom used together by the same users; there is little dual
use. ThisisnotonlybecauseOSSsoftwareprimarilyworksonUnixoperatingsystems, while
proprietary software often works on top of Windows, and most users use only one operating
systems for most of their needs. This is also because they use different standards, and it is
often difﬁcult for a Windows user to open a document created using OSS, and vice-versa.
There is a considerable difference too in the type of users both software attract, and this is not
only due to those users having different needs and thus using different software for different
functions. Indeed, there is almost always an OS alternative to proprietary software.
The main point of this part is to show network effects introduce incentives for OS develop-
ers to develop features that are less valuable to themselves, but of value to the market. The need
for OSS to reach users (who may become developers, or simply act as testers), is an incentive for
OSS developers to compete for market shares with proprietary software. This part therefore intro-
duces strategic elements in the behavior of OSS developers, who previously were merely internally
motivated.
The payoff to an user of type x who buys a software of value v at price p and which is used by
n users is now:
u(x) = xv − p + kn
where
x ∼ f[0,1], uniform
v ∈ {v,v,v + v}
(n,p,k) ∈ R3
There are two software, one proprietary and one open-source, and the two products are supposed
to be incompatible: n is the number of users of the software the user uses, not the total number of
people who use one or the other software.
Proposition 3 Network effects have two contradictory results: As long as the OSS doesn’t include
both features, the higher the network effects the higher the proprietary software’s market share, but
19the probability the OSS includes both features increases with k and when the OSS includes the two
features the proprietary software is out of the market.
Proof. In appendix C
Therearetwocontradictoryeffectsatplay: ifnetworkeffectsareveryimportant, the proprietary
software will want to get all the market but this gives OS developers more incentive to develop both
features, and in that case the proprietary software’s market share may be lowered to 0. Proprietary
software developers are thus in an awkward position as they cannot commit to leave a part of the
market to the OSS, which encourages OSS developers to compete more strongly with them, and
thus potentially gain the whole market.
The higher the network effects, the higher the number of consumers who will buy the full
featured proprietary software whenever that one is developed, but also, the higher the probability
that a fully featured OSS is developed. The resulting market condition are therefore more clear
cut: the higher the network effects, the more people use the proprietary software if it is developed.
However, high network effects mean the probability it will not be developed because a full-featured
open-source alternative will have been developed to counter it pre-emptively.
Proprietary proﬁts may or may not increase with network effects, so that as k increases, propri-
etary development may be discouraged quite apart from the fact a free alternative emerges.
4 Organizational objectives and competition
Two factors in the competition between OS and proprietary development were underlined in the
two previous parts: The better coordination in proprietary organizations, as well as the way features
developed OS or proprietary are chosen (based on cost of development in OS, on proﬁt potentials
in a proprietary model). Those choices processes were shown not to be equivalent.
Other aspects were not taken into account, especially some which favor the OS software orga-
nization, notably a better ﬁt between the software functionality that are developed OS and the way
the software is used by the average user in the general users’ community. There is indeed a ten-
dency for proprietary software to become bloated as development is directed toward providing new
functionalities so as to attract new segments of the users’ population, at the expense of improving
existing functionalities that are of use to the broader users’ population.
This part deals with the difference in features choices between OSS organizations and propri-
etary software ﬁrms. The case study outlined the difference between proprietary ﬁrms that want
to attract new users to their product by including features that they value the most, and an OSS
organization that, at least in the case of TEX, cares mostly about existing users and tries to improve
the existing software, not ﬁnd new domains of application or increasing its market share. The issue
is in fact rather muddled, as OSS advocates say that any new user with new requirement can adapt
20the software to its own need, so that OSS would be more efﬁcient than proprietary software at sat-
isfying the fringe user. Proprietary software, on the other hand, would be unable to be as versatile
in its application because of two effects: the user-interface which is difﬁcult to change and adapt
to integrate new functions, and the closeness of the development process, which shields developers
from new inﬂuences and users’ requirement.
However, in the case of TEX new radical projects did have difﬁculties getting off the ground, and
this was partly due to organizational inertia (but also to the difﬁculty for an OSS organization with
very limited funds to undertake radical restructuring of a mature program). That inertia was related
to the fact those improvements concerned only a fringe of the user base, and to high network effects
that dissuaded those who potentially would have been interested in the new projects from leaving
the old project and forfeiting the beneﬁt of an established base of users with whom to exchange
documents with. On the other hand, proprietary software based on TEX did frequently propose new
and original features that were in demand by users outside of the realm of interest of existing TEX
users (most notably, an user-interface, but also original and easy to manipulate fonts sets (Y&Y),
or a computation software (MuPAD in Scientiﬁc Workplace)). The contrast is not clear cut, since
the OS TEX organization did come to integrate new font sets, a complete distribution and also pdf
format output. But there is clearly a difference in emphasis and in ﬁnancial means that resulted in
those improvements coming later into standard OS use than in proprietary software based on TEX.10
Let us therefore look at a variation on the model. The difference with the preceding models
is that there are two types of consumers and two software products that may or may not have the
same functionalities. As before, there are two functionalities, but they do not have the same value
depending on whether you belong to one type of consumer or the other. As in the preceding part,
there are network effects and the two products are incompatible. Unlike the previous parts, only
one feature may be developed: the OS community and the entrepreneur must simply decide which
feature to develop for their respective product.
There are two kinds of users of type t = old (‘O’) and new (‘N’), in proportion s and 1 − s
respectively, who value two features, f = 1 and 2 differently. Old users value feature 1 at v1O, and




so that the old users would prefer to see the ﬁrst feature developed, while new users would prefer
to see the second one developed.
An OS organization and a ﬁrm decide at the same time which feature to develop. They can
develop only one feature due to time and money constraints. The open-source organization is
composed of members of the old user-base, and will therefore decide to develop the feature that
21beneﬁts that part of the users’ community, while the proprietary ﬁrm will develop the feature that
brings it highest proﬁts. It sets its price P such that it serves a portion 1 − xO of the old user base
and portion 1 − xN of the new users. The rest are served by the OSS, whatever feature that one
develops.
There are network effects and the two products are incompatible, so that the payoff to an user
of type x belonging to section t ∈ (O,N) of the user base who buys a proprietary software with
feature f ∈ (1,2) at price P is:
uP(x,f,t) = xvft − P + k[(1 − s)(1 − xN) + s(1 − xO)]
while the payoff of using an open-source software with the same feature is:
uOS(x,f,t) = xvft + k[(1 − s)xN + sxO]
where





Proposition 4 The proprietary software will decide either to serve only the new user base by devel-
oping the feature they most value, or will serve the whole market by developing the feature that is





9 that the second feature
will be developed.
Proof. In appendix D
The fact that for k low relative to v2N −v1N, the entrepreneur will prefer to develop the second
feature and concentrate on the fringe is understandable: having a large market share is not worth
so much (network effects are small) while the fringe’s relative value for the new feature is high
(v2N − v1N is high). For k high relative to v2N − v1N, the opposite will occur: the ﬁrm will want
to develop the ﬁrst feature and sell to the whole market at price k.
For k medium and s low, the ﬁrm could prefer screening customers based on their type rather
than exploiting network effects to the maximal extent, but that case doesn’t happen with the speci-
ﬁcations of the model (linear network effects, uniform distribution for consumers’ types).
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Figure 1: Proﬁt as a function of k depending on the feature developed.
The graph above represents proﬁt as a function of k (bold line). If the ﬁrst feature is developed,
proﬁt is a linear function of k (Π1). If the second is developed, it is a convex function of k (Π2).
Therefore, there should be a level for k high where it becomes more proﬁtable to develop the second
feature again. However, for such k, it becomes impossible to convince new customers to buy the
new feature, because they prefer joining the old users and use the OS product with the ﬁrst feature.
This is because k is so high that the beneﬁt of everyone using the same software outweigh the
beneﬁt of using a software that better ﬁts your aims, and it becomes impossible to sell the product
with the new feature. This explains why there is no level of k high where the ﬁrm prefers screening
customers from the new user base rather than sell to all and come into direct competition with the
OSS. There is also no level of k medium high, where the proﬁt with the new feature is higher than
with the old feature, and consumers can be tempted into buying the new feature. This is because the
limit above which the consumers’ always prefer to all use the same feature ( v2N−v1N
max[1,2(1−s)]) is lower
than the limit above which proﬁt with the second feature is higher than proﬁt with the ﬁrst.
This could be put into relation with the choice of feature development by proprietary software
companies that built their product on TEX. It is possible from this model to infer from k quite high
in the case of TEX that the optimal strategy for the ﬁrms is to develop the same kind of features
as what OS developers would want. Of course, this is valid only if, as was assumed here, the
proprietary ﬁrm is able to impose sufﬁcient costs of switching from its product to the OS one, so
that the two products can be considered as incompatible: an OS user would not beneﬁt from the
presence of the proprietary users and vice versa. In the case of TEX, this is indeed the strategy
that was followed to some extent, with Scientiﬁc Workplace for example using some proprietary
23functionalities that make it difﬁcult to transcribe documents generated with it into common L ATEX
format, or Y&Y using proprietary fonts. Changing that assumption of no compatibility will result in
lowering proﬁts when both systems produce the same feature, but doesn’t change the main insights
of the proposition.
This part therefore explains why the features that were developed in a proprietary way, apart
from the interface, where soon included into the OS version too (more fonts, better integration of
functionalities, capacity to output pdf ﬁles, etc...). They were functionalities that the original users
needed too. The only advantage of the proprietary ﬁrm was therefore in being able to propose an
interface and offer new features to the general users population faster than the OS organization (see
note 12). In the longer term, as the product becomes complete and users more expert in the use of
the software and don’t need the interface anymore, they ultimately all end up with the OS version.
This is what seems to have happened in the case of TEX: ﬁrms that based their product uniquely on
TEX almost disappeared from the market, as their only advantage was in their interface which was
valuable to smaller and smaller cohorts of new users. The only survivors were those that diversiﬁed
and included non-TEX programs into their package.
5 Discussion of the difference GPL vs. BSD
In the present paper, the GPL license was assumed to be the only one available. In the GPL,
the entrepreneur cannot use the features that were developed open-source. If they are under the
BSD, then the entrepreneur could use them and integrate them into her proprietary product. That
distinction can be seen in practice, as GPL open-source software was developed as an open-source
equivalent of existing proprietary software (GNU/Linux as a replacement for Unix, Gnome as a
replacement for Windows) while there are many proprietary software that use BSD open-source
elements in the background or as an interface to open-source software (Scientiﬁc Workplace for
TEX). However, there are proprietary distribution of GPL open-source software (Red Hat for Linux)
and it is possible to build proprietary features on top of GPL software so that the difference between
the two shouldn’t be overemphasized.
In the terms of the ﬁrst model with the interface, assuming the license is BSD instead of GPL
changes two results: the ﬁrst is that the case where the proprietary software has less features than
the OSS disappears. There is therefore no case where the proprietary software serves low value
users and a BSD OSS serves high value ones. The second change concerns welfare: it is always
higher with the BSD, because there is an economy in development costs. What is developed OS
can be exploited by a proprietary ﬁrm.
Another difference between the GPL and the BSD case is not taken up by the model: With
the BSD we can potentially have three types of software, one ‘pure proprietary’ which features
are developed independently, and then sold on the market, one ‘mixed proprietary’ which borrows
features from the open-source software and builds on it to sell on the market, and one pure open-
24source software. However, the mixed-proprietary software will always enjoy an advantage over the
pure proprietary software, because it will in any case save on the cost of developing the highest
valued feature. The BSD case is therefore better from the point of view of welfare than the GPL
case because the proprietary ﬁrm economizes on development cost, and its price will be equal or
lower than in the equivalent situation when the software is BSD. Consumer welfare is therefore also
improved.
However, and this is where the model ﬁnds its limit, mixed proprietary software is more vul-
nerable to competition from open-source software than pure proprietary software. Indeed, because
it is at least partially compatible with OS software, it is easier for its users to switch to the pure OS
version as soon as that one offers greater ease of use. A model could therefore be developed where
proprietary ﬁrms balance reduced development cost with lower possibilities to exploit network ef-
fects to their exclusive advantage.
In a companion paper, Gaudeul (2004) explains the inﬂuence of software’s license terms on its
development.
6 Conclusion
This is one of the ﬁrst paper looking at competition between two radically different software de-
velopment techniques, open-source and proprietary. The originality is in looking at how that co-
existence inﬂuences product design, both from the point of view of OS developers and from the
point of view of software ﬁrms. Three aspects were studied: how proprietary software companies
can maintain themselves in the face of OS competition by offering a better user interface, how net-
work effects encourage OS developers to develop more features, and how proprietary ﬁrms may
want to differentiate by developing different features than OS ones.
The paper explains many ﬁndings from the (L A)TEX case study, notably why proprietary soft-
ware developers basing their product on TEX attach so much importance to the interface as a way
to survive faced with the OS version. It also explains how the existence of a proprietary alternative
led TEX developers to devise ways to better take into account the interests of the general user popu-
lation, and not, as is often assumed, exclusively their own. This led to the creation of an inﬂuential
and efﬁcient network of users’ organizations that greatly contributed to the continued dynamism in
TEX development, and to its democratization and wide use. Finally, the paper explains proprietary
software may sometime be more responsive to new users’ needs than OSS. The two strategies used
by proprietary ﬁrms were therefore to design better interface and develop features for users with
special needs who were unable to develop them themselves or to use the OS solution.
257 Extensions and other perspectives
An obvious extension would be to combine the three partial models we have into one. This would
notably allow to better understand how network effects inﬂuence the software design, as in the ﬁrst
model with network effects, high network effects could lead either to all the market going to the
proprietary software or to the OSS, while in the second, high network effects lead to the whole
market going to the proprietary software.
The possibility that some segment of developers do not value each feature the same way than
others was introduced, without acknowledging that this may increase the number of features that
will be developed OS: a feature may have a lower value on average for the market, but high value
to some, who will therefore be motivated to develop it even if development costs are high. There
would therefore be higher probabilities that the OSS is full-featured.
On the other hand, there may also be a difference in each type of software’s target consumers:
Sophisticated users can with some effort make the few adjustments necessary in open-source soft-
ware so as to use of it efﬁciently, while unsophisticated users need all features pre-installed to make
use of the software. The ﬁrst type of consumers would decide to use the open-source software OSS
based on a cost comparison with the proprietary software, while the second type would never be
able to use OSS. This would reduce the impact of OS on proprietary software production.
A dynamic model would allow to take into account the differences in pace of development
of OSS vs. proprietary software, as this is a matter of much discussion; OSS would always be
one step ahead in terms of the development of basic, most valuable functions, while proprietary
software would elaborate on those functions so as to make them marketable to the general public.
The interface would have to be constantly updated to integrate new functions, which means there
would be a delay in the integration of new functions.
As explained in another part of the paper, there is a symbiotic relationship between OS and
proprietary software, as proprietary software based on OSS acts as a ﬁrst step towards the use of
the more sophisticated OS versions of the software. On the other hand, OSS development provides
the basics upon which the proprietary software can develop. The relation is symbiotic because
one is not always beneﬁcial to the other. Switching from one version of the software to another
could therefore be modeled as consumers gain expertise in its use (encouraging them to use the
OS version) and as the proprietary software’s interface becomes more sophisticated (encouraging
consumers to use the proprietary version). Proprietary software based on open-source must also be
distinguished from proprietary software that is developed independently: the model doesn’t allow
to understand the distinction other than in trivial terms.
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Notes
1Gaudeul (2003b) is a long version of the case study, available on http://agaudeul.free.fr.
2This is the chicken and egg problem: if many users choose to use the new project, then others will do so too, but if
none do, none will. In the absence of a coordination device, an individual will not use the new project in the belief others
won’t either. This is because if she is the only one to participate in the new project, and even if the project is very good,
there is almost no chance she will be able to ﬁnish it.
3OSS arguably is more ergonomic to an experienced user than proprietary software with many ‘intuitive’ features.
4Note however that some TEXdevelopers want to contribute to the success of Linux in contesting the Microsoft
desktop monopoly and are trying to develop Word-like interfaces for TEX. (LYX, XeMTEX, TEXMacs, ...) While those
developers see improvements in TEX mainly as a way to increase the value of the Linux operating system, they contribute
in getting some new users to TEX and prevent the number of users of TEX from becoming so low as to endanger its
survival.
5Indeed, some innovation in TEX were sometime directly integrated in proprietary products, such as its hyphenation
and justiﬁcation algorithm, or quite simply, the idea that writers could deal with most typesetting tasks.
286This means that if both features are developed and the user is of type x, she will get value x(v + v) from using the
software.
7That cost can be divided along two dimensions: a cost which depends on how much they will use the software (which
is related to the parameter x), and a ﬁxed cost to install it and learn how to use it. Proprietary software is frequently seen
as easier to install, learn and use than OSS. This is attributed to a motivation problem for developers, who do not beneﬁt
as much as users from designing helps for installing and learning the software, since they already installed and learned
it. However, there is a difference between the ﬁxed, set-up costs of the software, and the continuing, usage costs of the
software. Those last ones are incurred by developers and users alike, and probably even more so by developers because
they are heavy users of the software. It could be argued that the cost of using an OSS is lower in the long term than for
proprietary software, because OSS frequently provides more shortcuts and customization possibilities than proprietary
software. This may be due to the incentives of developers to develop software that is easy to use, if not easy to learn. In
the model, we neglect those usage costs and concentrate on ﬁxed set-up costs.
8Alternatively, consider the second feature as a feature easing the use of the software and whose value is directly
related to how valued the ﬁrst feature is. See note 1 on the difference between usage cost and installation cost.
9For more on the Linux/Minix controversy, see: http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/opensources/book/appa.html. Note
this comment by Peter MacDonald: “I feel compelled to comment on my reasons for switching from Minix to Linux. In
order of importance they are:
1) Linux is free
2) Linux is evolving at a satisfactory clip (because new features are accepted into the distribution by Linus).”
10The process of development and democratization of OSS is three-fold:
Sophisticated users ﬁnd ways to integrate new features (in the case of TEX, design new fonts, produce pdf ﬁles).
Their needs usually preﬁgure future needs in the general users’ population.
A standard solution emerges. Commercial developers, who in the case of TEX can be well integrated into the OS
developers’population, take it up and integrate the new feature into their proprietary system.
The standard solution becomes available to those in the general user population that cannot or don’t want to pay the
commercial software companies. This is done through individual or users’ group sponsored efforts.
A Proof of proposition 1
The entrepreneur maximizes proﬁts subject to u(x,Prop) ≥ u(x,OS), and u(x,Prop) ≥ 0. Deﬁne
ψ(prop) the set-up cost for the proprietary software, and v(prop) the value of the proprietary soft-
ware’s features. The ﬁrst constraint admits three cases: if v(prop) > v(OS), then customers of
type x ≥ x2 =
ψ(prop)+P−ψ
v(prop)−v(OS) buy the proprietary software. If v(prop) = v(OS) then we must
have P ≤ ψ−ψ(prop). If v(prop) < v(OS) then customers of type x ≤ x2 buy the software. The
second constraint says that customers of type x ≥ x1 will buy the software, with x1 =
ψ(prop)+P
v(prop) .
There are different cases, depending on which features the entrepreneur chose to develop. Ob-
viously, the entrepreneur will have developed the highest valued feature in preference to the lowest
valued one, since they both cost the same to develop. She will also have developed either the second
feature, or the interface, or both, else she wouldn’t be able to sell her software at a positive price to
anybody (indeed, the open-source software will always include the highest valued function).
There are therefore three cases, either the entrepreneur only developed the second highest val-
ued feature (Case A), or only the interface, (Case B) or she developed both (Case C).
Case A:
Suppose that the open-source software includes the highest valued feature only. This happens
29withprobability1−α+αλ.Indeed, withprobability1−αthetwodeveloperswerenotawareofeach
other, and with probability α the second one was aware of the ﬁrst one’s work but faced too high
a cost to develop the second feature. There is therefore an alternative of value v to the proprietary
software and the entrepreneur can sell her software for a price P to maximize proﬁts subject to the
users’ incentive compatibility constraint. The software is thus sold to a fraction π(P) =
R 1
x f(z)dz
of the n potential users, s.t. u(x,Prop) ≥ u(x,OS), and u(x,Prop) ≥ 0. Consumers value for the
second feature is distributed according to vx with x ∼ f(x) a c.d.f. over [0,1].






vx − P > 0
(v + v)x − ψ − P > 0
Then x∗ is such that x∗ =
1−F(x∗)
f(x∗) , s.t. xf0(x) + 2f(x) > 0 (Concavity of the proﬁt function),
and P∗1
A = min[vx∗,(v + v)x∗ − ψ] = vx∗ by assumption (Notation: P∗1
A is the optimal price in




If the open-source software includes both functionality, then the entrepreneur cannot sell her
software at a positive price, and UE < 0. The proprietary software is therefore not developed and




Iftheopensourceproductincludesonlyonefeature, theentrepreneurmaximizesUE = Pn
R 1
x f(z)dz−











f(z)dz − 2w and P∗1
B = ψ. No
consumer uses the OSS.
If the open-source software includes the two features, then she sells her software to any users






























v . xH will be more than xL or P∗2
B ≤
ψv
v+v < ψ. Also, we will have u(xL,OS) =
(v+v)xL−ψ ≤ 0 : the OSS software will serve customers who have a high value for the software’s
features (interval [xH,1]) while proprietary software will serve those who have medium value for
it (interval [xL,xH]) The proprietary software’s proﬁt is thus P∗2
B n
R xH
xL f(z)dz − 2w.
Case C:
If the open-source product includes only one feature, then the proprietary software ﬁrm will
sell to any user such that P − ψ ≤ xv and (v + v)x − P ≥ 0. Her proﬁt is therefore min[x∗v +
ψ,(v + v)x∗]n
R 1
x∗ f(z)dz − 3w = (x∗v + ψ)n
R 1
x∗ f(z)dz − 3w by assumption and the price is
30P∗1
C = P∗1
A + ψ. The OSS serves consumers in the interval [
ψ
v ,x∗].
If the open-source product includes two features, then the entrepreneur can sell her product at




f(z)dz − 3w or
(v +v)x∗n
R 1






f(z)dz − 3w, and the price will be P∗2
C = ψ. No consumer uses the OSS.
There are therefore two cases, either the OSS developed one feature or two.
In case it developed only one feature, then the entrepreneur has to choose between A, B or C.
We have B > A if ψ > ψ1 with ψ1 = vx∗ 1−F(x∗)
1−F(
ψ
v) ≤ vx∗. C > A for w < w1 and C > B for





). w1 > w2
iif ψ > ψ1. Therefore, if ψ > ψ1, C is chosen for w < w2 and B is chosen for w > w2, while if
ψ < ψ1, C is chosen for w < w1 and A is chosen for w > w1.
In case the OSS developed two features, then A is never chosen, as it leads to 0 proﬁts, and the
comparison between B or C depends on whether w is higher than w3 deﬁned by the comparison of
proﬁts between the two options.
B Proof of proposition 2
By assumption, a monopoly proprietary software develops both features and the interface. This
means expected ﬁxed costs of development 2Ec + C are not too
high. Since there are no marginal costs of production, the optimal price from the point of view
of social welfare is 0. The possible losses in welfare compared to optimality in such conditions thus
can have three reasons:
• Less people buy the software, either open-source or proprietary,
either because it is too expensive (Proprietary) or because it is too difﬁcult to learn (OS);
• More people buy the software, either open-source or proprietary, but for some it has less
features than before, or they do not have access to an interface.
• The proprietary software is not developed because the wage w to be paid is too high to justify
competing with the OSS. The interface is then not developed, and there is a risk the second
feature is not developed due to some mis-coordination in the OS organization.
The ﬁrst reason can be rejected; vx∗ ≥ ψ which means that the arrival of an OSS, even if it has
only one feature, will always increase the number of software users.
The second reason can arise for w and ψ high; the proprietary ﬁrm develops the interface but
not the second feature, so that its value is lower, but more people have access to the proprietary
software: xL < x∗. The effect is ambiguous. In the case where the OSS includes both features,






[(v + v)z − ψ]f(z)dz − 3Ec − C ≥
Z 1
x∗
(v + v)zf(z)dz − 2Ec − C
The left hand side shows welfare from the consumption by lower valuation consumers of the
proprietary software, plus the welfare from the consumption of the OSS by high valuation con-
sumers, minus the cost of development (feature + interface for the proprietary software, two fea-
tures for the OSS). The right hand side shows total welfare when there is a proprietary software
monopoly.
It can also happen for ψ low and w high; the proprietary ﬁrm develops the two features but not
the interface but more people have access to the software. This happens only if the OS software








on the left hand-side is the welfare of the additional consumers who have access to the software
in its OS form, plus the saving in interface development costs, while on the right hand side is the
loss due to the fact the proprietary software doesn’t have an interface anymore, plus the additional
development cost due to duplication of effort (note that in the OS case, even if the software has got
only one feature, there still are two developers who work on it, but in an uncoordinated way).
Finally, when the proprietary development is discouraged, the total welfare may also be lower
due to the same kind of effect: higher number of users, but they have to incur more set-up costs. If
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i.e. savings in development costs and the additional consumer welfare compensates the con-
sumer’s loss from not having access to an interface.
C Proof of proposition 3
The proprietary software will have to include both feature if it is to sell at a positive price. When
deciding whether to develop the second feature, OS developers compare the value of the OS soft-
ware in case it has all features, and thus attracts all users, compared to it value if it has only the ﬁrst
feature and thus attracts a much lower proportion of users. They therefore choose to develop the
32second feature if:
v + v + ϕ(n) − c ≥ v + ϕ(n1)
with n1 the number of users the OS software attracts when it has only one feature.
n1 depends on the pricing decision of the proprietary software when faced with an OS software
that includes only one feature. The entrepreneur cannot commit on this price, so that there are
two cases: either that price is high so that the share of users the OSS gets even when it has only
one feature is sufﬁcient to discourage them from developing the second feature, or it is low and
OSS developers feel motivated to develop the second feature. In that second case, the proprietary
software can sell only if the OSS developers are not put into contact by the OSS organization and
thus both develop the ﬁrst feature only.
The price of the proprietary software will be 0 if the OSS includes both features. If it includes








In this case, where there are no set up costs, u(x,OS) ≥ 0 so that it is the ﬁrst constraint that
binds. It can be rewritten as:
x(v + v) − P + ϕ(n − n1) ≥ xv + ϕ(n1)
but n1 = nx, so that we have:
P ≤ xv + ϕ(n − nx) − ϕ(nx)
and the entrepreneur maximizes:
UE = [xv + ϕ(n − nx) − ϕ(nx)]n[1 − F(x)] − 2w







P(x) = xv + ϕ(n − nx) − ϕ(nx)
Does that result in a lower or higher share x of OS users than before? When does the new
decision result in a price so low that the OS developers decide to develop the second feature every
33time they are put into contact?
Note ﬁrst that the hazard rate function r(x) =
f(x)
1−F(x) is monotone increasing with x because




P0(x) = x + kn
v−2kn is increasing with x and the optimal x with network effects will be less than
without (when
P(x)
P0(x) was equal to x), i.e. the proprietary software will have a higher market share
than without network effects.




2n], i.e. the proprietary ﬁrm takes all the market




v−2kn for k ≤
v
3n, and the proprietary ﬁrm sets
P = 1
2(v − kn).




2n], an OSS developers with development cost c will choose to develop the second
feature if
v + v + kn − c ≥ v
or
v − c ≥ −kn
Therefore, if v − c ≥ −kn, there is a probability α the OSS includes both features and then
the proprietary software has a 0 market share. If not, then the probability the OSS includes both
features is the same as without network effects, or α(1 − λ).
For k ≤
v
3n, an OSS developers with development cost c will choose to develop the second
feature if























v−2kn > −kn as k ≤
v





D Proof of proposition 4
If the proprietary software develops the second feature (the one most valued by the new users),
then it has two choices, either set the price such that it is bought only by new users, or lower it
such that it is also bought by old users. If it develops the ﬁrst feature, then it competes frontally
with the OSS and will be able to charge a price commensurate with its global market share. For
simplicity, assume consumers expect the proprietary software to gain all the market and therefore,
a proprietary software gains the whole market when competing with an equivalent OSS. Then, the
proprietary software makes a proﬁt of k.11
The proprietary software will not want to develop the second feature and sell to all users because
that strategy is dominated by developing the ﬁrst feature and sell to all. Indeed, the price it would
be able to charge old users will always be lower than if it develops the ﬁrst feature, not only because
34that feature is not the one they value the most, but also because it will not be able to gain more users
than it does when it develops only the ﬁrst feature (based on the simplifying assumption it can get
all the market when competing with the OSS on the same feature), and therefore network effects
are no higher.
Therefore, either the proprietary software caters for new users only, and the open-source soft-
ware serves all the old users and a part of the new (those of low type), or the proprietary software
gets the whole market. We will check later that the OSS indeed always develops the ﬁrst feature.
Proﬁt in the ﬁrst case is obtained by maximizing:








xv2N + k(1 − s)(1 − x) − P ≥ xv1N + ks + k(1 − s)x
xv2O + k(1 − s)(1 − x) − P ≤ xv1O + ks + k(1 − s)x
The ﬁrst constraint will be saturated, which means the second will hold too, and therefore, the
entrepreneur maximizes:
UE = [x(v2N − v1N) + k(1 − s)(1 − 2x) − ks](1 − s)(1 − F(x))
If v2N − v1N − 2k(1 − s) ≤ 0 then the derivative of the proﬁt function with respect to x is
always negative so that x∗ = 0. But in that case, P = k(1−2s), and even if this is more than zero,
proﬁt is still k(1 − 2s)(1 − s) < k and the entrepreneur thus prefers developing the ﬁrst feature.
As f is uniform, then x∗ = 1−A
2 with A =
k(1−2s)
v2N−v1N−2k(1−s) and for v2N − v1N ≤ k, x∗ = 1
so that the entrepreneur doesn’t sell.
Therefore, the second feature will not be developed as long as v2N −v1N ≤ max[k,2k(1−s)].
If v2N − v1N ≥ max[k,2k(1 − s)], then proﬁt when the second feature is developed is UE =
(1−s)(v2N−v1N−k)2
4(v2N−v1N−2k(1−s)) to be compared with proﬁts of k if the ﬁrst feature is developed. The ﬁrst






























so that the second fea-






35Verify also that the open-source organization will always prefer to develop the ﬁrst feature
rather than the second, because this always will be in the best interest of its constituent. Indeed,
developing the second feature only means the old users get less value from the software: its value
is lower than the ﬁrst feature’s value, and the OSS in that case will not get as many users than if the
ﬁrst feature had been developed.
E A brief history of the development of TEX and its competitors
For dates, the reading of that chronology should be accompanied by the reading of the graphical
chronology of the development of TEX p.3712. That chronology divides the development of TEX
according to a typology (core, macro, organization) that is explained later. It also presents the
chronology of the development of alternatives to the open-source TEX system. That is divided in
four parts according to the typology exposed in the table 1 p.10.
The development of the TEX system can be divided in three areas: development of the core, de-
velopment of macros on top of the core, and the development of the infrastructure allowing easier
use and development of the TEX system. TEX itself went through three versions, all developed by
D.E. Knuth. TeX2C, renamed Web2C, allowed to translate the TEX source code into C, the dom-
inant programming language. This provided the basis for most subsequent TEX implementations
and distributions (more on that later). Later on, as the development of TEX was frozen, various
projects came about to rewrite and expand the core: eTEX, NTS, pdfTEX, Omega, with pdfTEX
being currently the most used as it corresponds to the general need to generate pdf ﬁles with TEX.
Macro development on top of TEX came about very rapidly after the release of the ﬁrst versions
of TEX, as each author was supposed to develop its own set of macros. L ATEX by Lamport came to
be the dominant macro package as it ﬁt the needs of most users. Its development was taken over by
the L ATEX3 team which developed L ATEX2ε, while Hans Hagen developed his own set of macros,
ConTEXt.
The TUG was ﬁrst set up to diffuse information about TEX and encourage meeting of develop-
ers and the use of the program. It is only in the 90s though that it set up a common repository for
TEX packages (CTAN) and a common directory structure for TEX distributions (TDS). TEXLive, the
ofﬁcial open-source L ATEX distribution was based on Web2C and the teTEX distribution, which was
translated for Windows systems into fpTEX. Independently of that community effort, the MikTEX
Windows distribution was very popular. Interfaces were developed, the most popular being Win-
Shell. Further in the effort to standardize the OS L ATEX offering, the L ATEX Project Public License
was adopted for most packages in a L ATEX distribution. In order to facilitate the inclusion of TEX
systems into the Debian Linux distribution, it was slightly changed to conform to the Debian OS
guidelines.
Competition had various faces: prior to TEX there existed proprietary typesetting systems
(Script, Scribe, roff) of which only roff had a lasting legacy. The main competitors for TEX’s clien-
tele came in the middle 80s, with MSWord taking up the less sophisticated users while publishers
36Figure 2: Chronology of the development of TEX
37adopted QuarkXpress, Framemakers and other proprietary systems. Those systems were relatively
easy to learn, were self contained and were able to establish themselves as standards in the industry.
QuarkXpress particularly became the equivalent of the QWERTY keyboard in the industry: not
necessarily the most efﬁcient or powerful, but any typesetter knew how to use it. Adobe bought
Pagemaker in 1994 and Framemaker soon after and gradually imposed its standards (postscript,
then pdf) to the industry. It launched its own desktop publishing application, Indesign, in 2000.
Another type of “competition” for OS TEX systems came from proprietary typesetting systems
based on TEX. PCTEX, Y&Y, TEXtures, Scientiﬁc Word, ... thus based their product on propri-
etary TEX implementations, and were able to sell because of their better fonts (Y&Y), interface
(WYSIWYG interface of Scientiﬁc Word) or adaptation to a platform that was neglected by the
OS community (Macintosh by TEXtures, personal computers by PCTEX in its time). WinEdt only
provided an interface to standard OS TEX distributions and was sold at a much lower price than
those proprietary implementations of TEX.
Open-sourcecompetitionwasmainlyinpromotingalternativetypesettinglanguagesthanL ATEX,
enablingtypesetterstohaveawiderlatitudeinformattingtheirtext. ThisledtoaneffortintheL ATEX
community to make L ATEX SGML, then XML compliant. Direct OS competitors to mainstream TEX
were inspired by it, such as LYX or TEXMacs, which were variations on the concept of WYSIWYG
interfaces to TEX and were generally less ﬂexible than a full TEX distribution but easier to use and
learn.
38